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CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS 
OF THE NAVY 
Joseph 13. McDevitt 
I t is always a pleasllre for me to be 
here at the War College to discuss with 
you some of the current problem areas 
that we face in international law. 
When we speak of the Navy's area of 
operations at sea, we are speaking of air, 
surface, and suhsurface operations in an 
area which is almost entirely heyond Ihe 
sovereign territory of the United States 
and any othrr nation. Our right to lise 
this area is determined largely by a 
variety of rules of internutionallaw. 
Th·ere arc many kinds of thread 
woven into the fabric known as interna· 
tional law. Whether written or un-
written, international law represents the 
consensus of the community of nations. 
I t is evidenced in part by interna· 
tional conventions which are binding on 
slates hy agreement and, in many euses, 
arc hindin~ h('('ausl' tlwy codify eus· 
tOlllury internutionallaw. 
II is in part r('pn~s('ntcd hy stale 
prul'licl's of long standing which, though 
never formalized, huve been accepted, 
shared, or ucquiesced in by the other 
members of the community of nations. 
[t is reflected by the decisions of the 
International Court of Justice and the 
derisions of the highest courts of the 
various countries. 
It includes tlH~ teachings and writings 
of eminent publicists who have studied 
the relationship between states in the 
light of the times in which they lived. It 
is this pucka~e that comprises the bulk 
of internationalluw. 
Though the concept of international 
luw may lack a preciseness to he found 
in municipal law, nevertheless it pro-
vides accepted standards for the mea-
surements of the conduct of nations. 
Our national policy is formulated 
and executed within the framework of 
the law of nutions. We are a purty to 
muny ulliances of collective s(~<:urity 
slIeh as NATO, SI':ATO, Ihn Organiza-
tion of A Illerieun Slates, ulllong others. 
We an~ bound by the ucccpled <:lIstoms 
und practices between nations and by 
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international conventions that hoth 
prescribe and proscribe conduct both in 
peace and in war. 
International law is, of course, not a 
completely effective instrument for in-
ternational peace. But it has progrl'ssed 
toward minimizing rr~ort to war or 
armed conflict as a method of settling 
international disputr8. When it fails to 
prevent armed conflict, it still operates 
to impose rights and duties on parties 
and nonparties to tl\(~ confliet. i\lore 
importantly, it provid(~s peaceful al-
ternatives to armed conflict. 
International law does not have a 
system of sanctions as we define and 
understand the term in municipal law, 
but this does not indicate that interna-
tional law is a myth, merely that it has 
limitations. The same could be said of 
any specialized Icgal system. There are 
many sanctions under international law 
which do work effectively. Among the 
most obvious and effective of these is 
the promise of reciprocation-either 
favorable or adverse. This provides a 
strong reason for states to ohscrve thc 
rules. 
Reconciling legal equality with politi-
cal inequality remains a serious impedi-
ment to the development of interna-
tional law. But effective seapower exer-
cised in support of the rule of law can 
he a positive force in providing a stahle 
background for the continucd growth 
and acceptance of international law. 
One area of international law of 
primary interest to the Navy is the law 
of the sea. Weare in a time when the 
oceans are being taken into a sphere of 
politics; a plcthora of newspaper and 
periodical articles on the law of the sea 
comes from all nations and conse-
quently creates a growing pressure on all 
governments to publicly justify their 
legal positions in this arl'a. 
Tlwrl' has developl'd an alarming 
h·ndency for compll'x international 
Il'gal iI:~8\1eS to hrcoJlle political foot-
balls. The dispute oVl'r the statm; of the 
waters off portions of the coast of 
South America has been straining rela-
tions between the United States and a 
number of South American nations for 
almost two decades. However. after a 
series of preliminary meetings, the 
United States entercd into discussions 
with Chile, Ecuador, and Pl'ru in August 
of last year aimed at arriving at a 
solution to this problem. I was in 
allendanee for a portion of these dis-
cussions. They are still in their prelim-
inary stages and therrforc I cannot 
elaborate on thcm except to note that 
silting down at a conference tablc is a 
first positive step taken toward the 
resolution of this persistent dispute over 
the right to use extensive areas of the 
high seas. The heated controversy and 
diploma,tic crisis occasioned by the tuna 
boat seizures point up the danger in-
volved in unilateral coastal state e1aims 
to sovereignty over areas of the high 
seas. 
Even more dramatic and tragic events 
have underlined the absolute necessity 
for arriving at uniform international 
I«'gal regimes for the world's oceans. 
These were the seizure of the U.S. 
intelligence ship Pueblo and the subse-
quent destruction of an unarmed recon-
naissance aircraft by North Korea. 
These incidents occurrcd on or over 
high seas areas. I n the United States, in 
the wake of the North Korean incidents, 
the Congress has considered a legislative 
proposal which would have undercut 
our present position on the 3-mile limit 
for the breadth of the territorial sea and 
would have greatly hindered any change 
for the formulation of any uniform 
international limit in the future. This 
proposal (S.J. Res 84) would have estab-
lished a territorial sea which could vary 
from 3 to 12 miles, depending on the 
extent of the territorial sea claimed by 
the other country involved; in other 
words, a territorial sra based on mutu-
ality. Administrative problems aside, the 
problem with this is that it would have 
bel'n tantamount to recognition of the 
legality of exercising any measure of 
territorial sea jurisdiction out to 12 
miles. A Senate vote on this proposal 
was averted only after extensive brief-
ings by DOn. This incident dl'mon-
straLed the dangl'r to opl'rationill mo-
bility of recognizing the unilateral 
extension of a nation's territorial sea 
without providing for adequate safe-
guards for navigation rights. 
Frequently, however, the easiest way 
to lose a right is to press it to the 
extr!'lIle. For example, until LI\(' he-
ginning of this century, it was gencrally 
agrecd that 3 miles was the maximum 
breadLh of the territorial sea and that all 
areas beyond were high seas in which all 
nations, among other things, had an 
equal right to fish. Since World War If 
several nations-notably Japan and the 
Soviet U nion-have developed huge fish-
ing fleets which can operate off the 
coasts of foreign countries thousands of 
miles away. The first sign of reaction 
came in Latin America, where, as J havc 
mentioned, several states proclaimed 
either 200-mile territorial seas or 
!WO-mile exclusive fishing Z()JW~, in 
order to control distant water fleets. 
Then in 1964 some of the most con-
s!'rvative :l-mile states in Western 
Europe signed the European Fisheries 
Convention which, in effect, reserved all 
fisheries out to 12 miles to these states. 
Subsequently, in 1966, the United 
States-the country which has the most 
to gain from free mw of tl\(' seas and the 
ain,pace above them-itself dl'clarl'd a 
9-mile I'xclusivl' fishl'ri!'s zone extt·nding 
sl'award from thl' outer limits of our 
3-mile territorial s!'a. 
Th!' establishment of this zone is an 
example of how DOD, and the Navy in 
particular, must recognize and evaluate 
significant nonmilitary national pres-
sures if the present dimensions of the 
high seas arc to be maintainl'd. 
Puhlic Law 119-6511 of 14 Ol'lohl'r 
I !)(j() I'stablislwd thl' I)-mile contip;uolls 
fishing zone. Thl' Sl'ltate' rl'port on this 
legislation make's it I'refe'etly clear that 
this was a reaction to intensive foreign 
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fishing operations off our coast. In 
earlier years the Navy had opposed such 
Il'gislation. It feared that the establish-
ment of the fishing zone would be the 
first step toward the undesirable forma-
tion of a 12-mile territorial sea. 
In 1966 the Navy merely entcred no 
objection to the zone-it did not sup-
port the establishment of the zone. In 
retrospect, that may have been a mis-
take since the U.S. 12 mile fisheries 
zone lends credence to an approaching 
12-mile territorial sea. The argument 
that such a zone was needed because of 
Soviet intelligence activities was ad-
vanced by the interests that wanted the 
zone established. It was never stated 
that the AGI's-though they might have 
trawler hulls-were warships and not 
fishing vessels. 
Since the enactment of Puhlic Law 
BC)-65B, therc have been constant efforts 
on the part of various interested lobbies 
to widen the scope of the law to 
prohibit all manner of activities to 
foreign fishing vessels within the zone, 
not just the extraction of fish from the 
zone. 
The most recent effort accomplished 
the enactment of Senate bill 1752 (S. 
1752) over opposition by the Depart-
ment of Defense. The wording of this 
amendment, whicIl makes it unlawful 
for any non-U.S. vessel "to engage in 
aetivites in support of a foreign fishery 
fleet" within the contiguous fishing 
zone or territorial sea, could be mis-
interpretl'd as authorizing interference 
with activities which do not have any 
relation to the protection of living 
resources of the territorial sea or fish-
eries zone. 
This is but a single illustration of 
how specialized legislation can have 
highly undesirable side effects. The 
DOD continues to maintain that the 
fisheries zone ig high seas for the pur-
POS(~ of navigation and that to qualify 
tlH' right to navigate or operate in the 
arca could be seen by others as a claim 
of a 12-mile territorial sea rather than a 
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contil!:uous fisheries zone. A series of 
similar gpeeial-purpose hills could he 
extremely d"trimental to our presently 
avowed position ~upportinl!: the mainte-
nance of the :3-mile territorial sea rule. 
The United States initially supported 
the :~-mile limit in 17c):~ when Secretary 
of State Jefferson informed the British 
and French :'Ilinisters that the United 
States had adopted a :~-mile zone; it has 
never ("Iainwd a I!:r!'alt'r distarH"~ as the 
hreadth of the territorial sea. IL has Iwen 
the traditional position of the United 
States, moreover, that the 3-mile limit is 
not only domesti:! law but that ;~ miles 
has heen the maximum hreadLh of the 
territorial sea it nt'ed recognize off Lhe 
coasts of other states. The United States 
has continued to support the doctrine 
of the freedom of the seas by vigorously 
opposing the claims of oLher govern-
ments to extend unilaterally Lheir terri-
torial seas beyond 3 miles. 
This problem of the gradual uni-
lateral extension of the territorial sea of 
coastal states exists where military 
operaLions are eonccrned. All of us 
know that if the United States forced 
Soviet warships to stay, let us say, at 
least 200 miles from our coast, thcn not 
just the Soviet Union, but every country 
in the world, would have a basis to 
dt'mand that American warships sLay 
200 llIiles from their coasts. 
BuL when you have to explain Lhis to 
a newf'paper editor who is involved in a 
crusade againgL the presence of Soviet 
intelligence f'hips off our coast, you are 
put in the difficult position of saying 
that, on balance, the defense of the 
United States is hetter served if we let 
those Russian ships stay there. But, I 
a~k you, would this he true if it were 
not for the worldwide deployment of 
our air and naval forces? Jt is therefore 
not ~urpriginl!: thaL mllny devl'lopinl!: 
l'()untril'~ whi("h pI'n"'i"e no din'!'t inlt'r-
1':;1 in lI:;in~ thl' :;I'a:; al ~rt'al t1i"lalll"':; 
from 1IIl'ir ~h()n' f,'('1 Ihal Illl'rt, is 
something Lo ~ain and very Iillll' to 
lose-in extending their territorial seas. 
The Navy is one of the strongest 
supporters of freedom of the seas. While 
new lind vllried USI'S are enll~rging, navi-
gation lind comnH'rt't' remain tlw IlIOSt 
valuable uses of the ocean. Efforts by 
coastlll states to impose unjustifiable 
restrictions and to improperly en-
compass world sealanes within rlaimrd 
territorial waLers must be resisted. Such 
unilateral attempts to extend sovereign 
control wiII rreatc confrontlltion situa-
tions with great potenLial for conflicL. 
Very important problems of mobility 
are involved. For example, while the 
right of innocent passage of vesscls 
through international straits may not be 
sngpended, there are disputes regarding 
the application of this right to warships 
and regarding the application of the 
criteria for identifying international 
straits. Should the right to establish a 
broader territorial sea be conceded with-
out concomitant guarantees of passage 
through waters of straits, intcrpretation 
of the right of innocent passage would 
become t'xtremdy critical. For cxample, 
SOIllC stales have ('lailllrd a unilatrral 
right to determine what kinds of passage 
are innocent even when, by objective 
standards, passage is clearly not pre-
judicial to peace, good order, or security 
within the coastal state. Well over 100 
siraits which would be within the sovrr-
I'ign Lerritory of eom;tlll states if, for 
example, a 12-mile territorial sea were 
conceded, might thl'n be closed to 
transiL by possihly capricious interpreta-
Lions of the right of innocent pllssage. 
The Straits of Gibraltar, Dover, Bah el 
i\landeh, and i\lalacca would be among 
them. The disruptive effect that such 
actions might have on our naval opera-
tions is obvious. Unless nllvigational 
guarantees are internationally recog-
nized by international agreement, the 
(I.S. NlIvy cannot afford to Irnd its 
support or !"('('ognition 10 IInilalc'rlll II'r-
ritorial SI'II ('Iaims in I'X('I'SS of :! milt,s, 
NI'illll'r (!ollld Ihe ,\ir I,'orel', I might 
add, sinee no right of inn(l('('nt pa~sage 
for staLe aircraft exists on the airspace 
ahove t!'rritorial watt·rt:. Of course, one 
factor which could significantly affect 
our continued adherence to the :3-mile 
policy would be to negotiate, preferably 
on a multilateral basis, for the mainte-
nance of high seas passageways through 
international straits regardl!'ss of the 
breadth of the territorial sea. Such a 
development would mitigate possible 
extensions of ll'rritorial seas without 
unduly j,'opardizing the worldwide 
mobility of our naval fon~l~s. 
J n addition to tlw international prob-
lems raised hy the dispute over the 
proper breadth of territorial seas, there 
arc additional prohlem areas involving 
the oceanic regimes which are of inter-
est to the Navy. The continued dis-
covery of new sources of both minerals 
and foods in the seas and on the ocean 
floor has occasion!'d a fantastic increase 
in the emphasis on the development of 
our technological ability to extract 
these resources on a practical and com-
petitive bash~.ln any area in which rapid 
utilization occurs, the d,wclopment of a 
set of valid rules or guidelines to saf!'-
guard against conflict among the various 
users will be necessary. The develop-
mcnt of such a set of rules is of prime 
interest to the Navy. We will nn-
doubtedly be called upon to protect our 
nationuls and tlll'ir I'conomil: udivitil's 
on thr ocean floor beyond whut are 
now recognized as ar!'as of coastal sover-
ei~nty. Equally important will be our 
task of rnsuring th!' propl'r utilization 
of these srab!'d areas in the preservation 
of our nutional security. 
The sl~abed areas to which I have 
bern refrrrin~ art' ~rnerally divided into 
two principal rrgimes: thr Contilll'ntal 
Shelf and the deep oeran floor. 
Thr Continl'lltal Shelf is d!'fined by 
the ] 95B Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf as till' seabed and 
stlhsoil of till' "the suhmarilH' ar!'as 
udjacl'nt to till' coast hut olllsidt' the 
an'a of th!' lI'rritorial sl'a. to a dl'pth of 
:WO meters, or heyond that limit. to 
wlll're lhl' depth of the :'lIprrjacent 
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waters admits of the exploitation of the 
natural resources of said areas." This 
convention embodies what we may call 
the international law of the Continental 
Shelf. The rules laid down by this 
convention further provide that the 
coastal state shall exercise "sovereign 
rights" in these areas for the purpose of 
exploration and exploitation of the 
natural resources of the seabed and 
subsoil thereof. It must be noted that 
this important convention affects only 
exploration and exploitation of the 
natural resources on the shelf. The 
consent of the coastal state must be 
ohtained "in respect of any research 
concerning the Continental Shelf and 
undertaken there." The convention, by 
its own terms, in no way affects the 
character of the superjacent waters as 
high seas which remain open to all and 
subject to the sovereignty of no nation. 
The Continental Shelf is becoming 
increasingly important as the techno-
logical ability to exploit its resources 
advances at an ever-accelerating rate. An 
increasing number of corporations 
throughout the world are taking an 
active interest in undersea operations. 
They arc developing tools and tech-
nology for extended operations on the 
Continental Shelf. The scientific and 
academic communities arc also COII-
ducting many research and development 
projects aimed at increasing man's effec-
tiveness beneath the ocean's surface. 
At pre$ent the extent of a nation's 
jurisdiction over the resources of the 
Continental Shelf is governed by the 
"200 metl~r or exploitahility depth" test 
of the 195B Continental Shelf Conven-
tion. This convention, however, COIl-
tains no precise definition of the outer 
boundary of the shelf. As a result, 
domestic and international controversy 
has arisen as to the ultimate boundary 
of a nation's Continental Shelf. The 
walt'rs have become more and morc 
muddy as the arguments concerning 
various boundary theories proliferate. 
The United States has been a leader 
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in discu~sions of this complex issue in 
many intl'rnational forums. It is particu-
larly likely that this maller will rel:t·ive 
considerahle alll'ntion in the Unitt·d 
Nations Seabeds CommiUee. The 
United StaLes has clearly indicated the 
importance of establishing a precise 
Continental Shd f boundary and has 
supported the principle that as soon as 
practicable an internationally agreed 
boundary should be determined. 
The complex problems involved in 
arriving at a precise outer boundary for 
the Continental Shelf have not damp-
ened world interest in discussing regimes 
for the deep ocean floor beyond the 
Continental Shelf. This broad expanse-
almost 7 miles deep at points-is largely 
unknown and unexplored. Yet the very 
mystery of the deep ocean floor stimu-
lates some to assume that it is a vast 
storehouse of easily available riches. 
This, in turn, has prompted lively inter-
est in the legal prohlems involved in thl\ 
utilization of this area. The Navy is, of 
course, also interested in these problems 
from the standpoint of the military 
utilization of these seabeds. 
Some have suggested that we divide 
the ocean floor between coastal states 
with median lines, much the same way 
as the seahed in the North Sea has heen 
divided. We must cOlu;ider the fact that, 
under a median line formula, the United 
States would rect'ive only a very narrow 
strip in the Atlantic and that small 
islands in the Pacific, some under Euro-
pean control, would hecome the center 
of enormous seabed domains. 
Others have urged turning the deep 
oeean seaht'd over to the United Na-
tions. Ambassador Pardo of l\'Ialta has 
proposed ercating a new international 
authority with broad powers to adminis-
ter and police the deep ocean floor. 
Senator P"II of Rhode Island has 
stopped short of this, prop()sill~ that the 
lInitl'd Nations bl' ~iVf\1I I{'a~ing au-
thority over the d{'{'p ocean floor in 
much the same way as the lntl'rior 
Department has leasing authority over 
our Continental Shelf. 
There are, however, respccted voiccs 
in both national and inLcrnational 
forums which urge thaL we have Loo 
soon become intoxicated with the 
promise of riches in the deep oceans; 
that we have little idea of what is to be 
found there and wiII not be able to 
conduct economical opera Lions in Lhis 
area for many years to come. These 
people urge that mankind has a far 
greater interest at this time in a unified 
effort to explore the ocean floor than in 
becoming embroiled in premature legal 
and poliLical disputes. 
The problems involved in regulaLion 
of a largely unknown environment have 
been involved in recent seabed dis-
armament discussions. The United 
States has constantly advocated steps to 
avoid the seabeds becoming an arena for 
another round of the arms race and has 
now agreed with the Soviet Union on a 
drafL treaty which was presented to the 
Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament (CeO) in Geneva recently. 
The joint draft treaty would prohibit 
emplanting or emplacing any objects 
with nuclear weapons or any other 
types of weapons of mass destruction as 
well as sLructures, launching installa-
tions, or other facilities specifically de-
signed for sLoring, Lesting, or using such 
weapons on the seabed and ocean floor 
or the subsoil thereof. The treaty pro-
hibitions would apply beyond the maxi-
mum contiguous zone provided for in 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 
Ct'rtainly agreement on this draft 
LreaLy indicates that on important items 
of significant interest cooperaLion be-
tween the world's two superpowers is 
feasible. However, it must also be noted 
that whatever the outcome of the sea-
beds disarmament talks or the ultimate 
form of any trl'aLy whieh may emerge, 
the many lind diverse views exprcssed in 
these negotiations Lhus far clearly point 
up the need for further hard knowledge 
of the deep ocean floor. 
From the point of view of the Navy, 
it may he in our best interest with 
respect to thr deep ocean floor to 
follow tllOf'e who insist that we apply 
the doctrine of freedom of the seas. In 
this case thrre would be no distinction 
in international law between the legal 
status of the high seas and that of the 
subjacent seabed beyond the Continen-
tal Shclf. Where navigation of subma-
rines is involved, we certainly are in-
terested in free seas. With respect to 
deep submersibles that will transit the 
bottoms by partial physical contact 
with the bottom, we ,are anxious to 
preserve free navigation on the ocean 
floor. Nevertheless, there will be those 
who will advocate the adoption of a 
doctrine recognizing the seabeds areas as 
being capable of being appropriated by 
the first occupier. With the advent of 
mining operations on the deep ocean 
floor, it is inevitable that there will he 
those who will, in the interest of devel-
oping the resources of the sea, seek state 
protection of areas capable of exploita-
tion. This may lead to claims of outright 
sovereignty of the deep ocean floor. If, 
ultimately, national control is estab-
lished to th~ full depth of the oeenn, 
effectively 20,000 feet, then there exists 
the complex and politically hazardous 
international task of dividing a territory 
more than three times as large as- that of 
the world's landmass. 
A reasonahle accommodation of 
users in accordance with the doctrine of 
freedom of the seas may be the most 
promising approach at this stage. As-
suming the remote possibility that a 
conflict between two exploiters of the 
deep ocean floor were to arise in the 
immediate future, it is clear that such a 
controversy would be governed by inter-
nntional law. At the very lI'ast, the 
prinriplc of frcrdom of thr scas would 
apply. It has 111'1'11 m'crpl,'d hy s,'"f"ring 
Ilations for cI'nturirs lhat frerdOIll of 
thr high seas shall be eXI!rciscd with a 
reasonable regard to the interests of 
other states in their exercise of the 
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freedom of the seas. 
Today we face a pl(:thora of fishing 
interests and oil interests, as well as 
political interests which view the oceans 
as an area of experimentation in interna-
tional organization. 
These interests have at their disposal 
a large battery of extremely competent 
and aggressive legal representatives. 
Each group appears to he single-
mindedly pursuing its own ends. Cer-
tainly, these diverse interests can and 
will be accommodated in a friendly 
manner. But, the only way in which the 
Navy can hope to advance its mission to 
safeguard the national security is to 
meet these challenges with equal prepa-
ration and expertise. Everyone can 
come up with a mockup of defense 
reasons for supporting any proposal. 
The challenge is for the Navy to take 
the lead by making fine "on ballanee" 
military decisions and advancing them 
persuasively and in unison. 
The lawyer can do no more than help 
his client decide and then do everything 
possible to insure that his client suc-
ceeds. For this we need penetrating 
analysis and deep reflection, with the 
sober realization that severe restrictions 
on the Navy's right to go where it needs 
on and under the seas will hamper its 
vital mission and inevitahly affect its 
central role in U.S. strategic and tactical 
planning. 
Man has now stepped on the moon 
-which dramatically reminds us that no 
area will remain forever inaccessible to 
mankind. However, the first footprints 
on the lunar surface do not constitute a 
superhighway which requires immediate 
formulation of an extensive traffic regu-
lation code. Likewise, the first steps of 
man into the depths of ocean space do 
not signal the need to immediately 
"h:lIlcion lhe inll'rnationallaw of lhl' sra 
which has rvolved oVI'r hundreds of 
years. This body of law cannot and 
should not be prematurely replaced 
with new legal regimes designed to mect 
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new needs and uses which are at best 
only partially foreseeable. 
Even with regard to the classic use of 
the surface of the high seas for naviga-
tion, we are faced with immediate and 
perplexing international legal problems. 
An example of such a problem has 
arisen as a result of the rapid Soviet 
buildup of naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean Sea. 
Since the Arah-hraeli war in June 
1967, we have been faced wi th this 
important naval confrontation in the 
Mediterranean. The strategic and politi-
cal implications of this confrontation 
are weighty indeed. However, I would 
like to describe briefly the legal context 
in which the Soviet Fleet, and in par-
ticular its suhmarine fleet, meets the 
American Fleet. 
There is nothing unique in having 
large naval fleets of two potentially 
hostile maritime powers deployed on 
the high seas in peacetime. Indeed, I can 
think of no extended period of time in 
modern history when this has not been 
the case. It is only natural for these 
fleets to seek maximum information 
regarding their respective oprrations and 
deployments. There is no legal prohibi-
tion to observation of naval operations 
on the high seas. Such activities are 
lawful so long as the observer dOf$ not 
unreasonahly interfere with the activi-
ties of the observed vessels-and vice 
versa. Specifically, when the vessels are 
near each other and there may be risk of 
collision, they must respect the detailed 
"rules of the road" established by the 
international regulations for preventing 
collisions at sea. 
However, from a legal point of view, 
vessels engaged in AS\\' operations 
present somewhat unique problems. 
These problems arise from the fact that 
although tlu're are highly d"taill'd navi-
gational mIt'S re:rardin:r surfllee ships 
which an' nt'ar t'ach other, this is not 
the case with submerged submarines. 
The international rules of the road 
generally apply only to vessels on the 
surface. 
This does nol mean there is no law 
on the subject, but rather that general 
principles of law have not been given 
detailed application in an international 
treaty. Thus, the problem is that of 
applying these general legal principles to 
operational facts. From existing prin-
ciples we can generally conclude that 
naval forces in time of peace must 
exercise prudent seamanship to avoid 
endangering foreign submarines and 
must not unreasonably interfere with 
their right to navigate or conduct other 
lawful activities on or under the high 
seas. 
However, in the context of main-
taining a submarine contact, additional 
unique facts are introduced. A specific 
example of this problem might be help-
ful. There is some judicial authority to 
the effect that a submarine navigating 
suhmcrged has a duty to remain dear of 
all surface ships. However, the rationale 
of the case was that since the location 
of the submarine could not be ascer-
tained by other vessels unless it was on 
the surface, the burden of staying clear 
necessarily falls upon the suhmarine. It 
is then·forc doubtful whether this legal 
precedent has any significant value 
where the surface ships involved have 
substantial capability to detl!ct tlw 
presence of the submerged submarine, 
and are, in fact, deployed for that 
purpose. 
The international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea were designed 
to dl'al with situations arising out of 
normal maritime traffic. Although their 
legal application is not so limitrd, there 
are no specific rules designed to handle 
a situation where one vessel actually 
desires to remain in close proximity 
with foreign vessels over a substantial 
pl'riod of time. Thrrrfort', we 31111 other 
lar:rt' naval powers m\l:;I, n·eol!nizing Iht' 
IU'crssit y 0 f obst'rving foreign naval 
operations on the high seas, rely on 
general rules requiring prudrnt seaman-
ship and prohibiting unreasonable inter-
ference. 
Thl' right of the United States to 
conduct naval exercises on the high seas 
is proteetl'd under international law 
from unrem;onable intl'rferenee. It 
would he difficult to aUempt to lay 
down hard and fast rulcs of remmnahle-
ness in advance where AS\\' opcrations 
an' concernl'd. The reason for this is 
rl·lativr.ly simple. Both the United Statcs 
and the Soviet lInion have inll~rests on 
both sides of the issue. We are each 
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coneerned with the rights of our sub-
marines as well as our ASW forces. It 
would be impractical to lay this ques-
tion before a large international con-
ference ill order to develop a lawmaking 
treaty on the subject. 
This is not an ideal situation, but it 
ilJlIstnltes that in practice a situation 
nol suhject to existing detailed legal 
rules can prove generally workable. 
Soviet reaction to quite a few contacts 
indicates they consider them significant 
naval incidents. 
----IfJ----
